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I.  Introduction 
 
During the past ten years, the intellectual activity of the arbitration community has been 
marked by an increased emphasis on guidelines, standards and codes of ‘best practices’ for 
the conduct of proceedings issued by groups such as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the 
International Bar Association, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA). For better or for worse, these have often been 
called the ‘soft law’ of arbitration procedure, as contrasted with the ‘hard law’ of national 
statutes and international treaties. Whereas ‘hard law’ offers rules directly giving effect to 
national norms, ‘soft law’ creates intra-practitioner directives of varying influence aimed at 
enhancing procedural uniformity among arbitrators and counsel from different judicial 
traditions.1 
 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Boston University; President, London Court of International Arbitration; 
General Editor, Arbitration International. Copyright © William W. Park, 2011. 
1  Such soft law would normally be memorialized in guidelines and standards of professional 
associations such as the IBA and the CIA or included in the ‘lore’ of practice as articulated by 
leading members of the arbitration community. Other forms of soft law seek to expedite litigation 
as an alternative to binding arbitration. See, e.g., International Institute for Conflict Prevention 
and Resolution, Economical Litigation Agreements for Commercial Contracts as a Means of 
Reducing Civil Litigation Costs – ‘The Model Civil Litigation Prenup’ (2010). See, generally, 
William W. Park, ‘Procedural Evolution in Business Arbitration’, in Arbitration of International 
Business Disputes (Oxford, 2006) p. 1. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3018723 
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Whatever the merits of the particular proposals (and not all commend themselves), the 
initiatives demonstrate a robust concern for greater precision in the contours of an arbitrator’s 
duties,2 whose definition remains anything but an easy task, with daunting dimensions that 
have caused the best of minds to sink beneath the waves of reflection.3 General descriptions 
will always remain inadequate, given that their expression relies on words connected 
sequentially, while reality remains stubbornly simultaneous in nature. 
 
II.  The Three Duties, Plus One 
 
A.  Accuracy, Fairness and Efficiency 
 
As a starting point for discussion, one might suggest three principal obligations of an 
arbitrator. As we shall see, however, the interaction of these duties will normally implicate a 
fourth set of responsibilities. 
 
The first duty of an arbitrator remains the rendering of an accurate award, in the sense of 
fidelity to the text and the context of the relevant bargain, whether memorialized in a private 
contract or in the terms of a public investment treaty.4 The arbitrator should aim to get as near 
as reasonably possible to an understanding of what actually happened between the litigants 
and how the pertinent legal norms apply to the controverted events. That arbitral awards are 
not generally reviewable for inaccuracy (mistakes of law or fact) in no way diminishes this 
obligation of the arbitrator to the parties. Arbitration would be a poor substitute for reliable 
justice if arbitrators were only held to standards constituting grounds for annulment. 
 
The second duty relates to procedural fairness, a capacious notion that incorporates several 
elements, notably: (i) the responsibility to hear before deciding, often called ‘due process’ or 
‘natural’ justice in the Anglo-American legal world, and principe du contradictoire in 
Francophone legal systems; (ii) an obligation to respect the contours of arbitral jurisdiction 
or, to put the duty in the negative, to avoid decisions which constitute an excess of authority 
(excès de pouvoir) either under the contract or by reason of some public policy constraint 
imposed on subject-matter arbitrability or procedure; and (iii) observation of the general duty 
of impartiality and independence.5 
 
The third duty lies in an aspiration towards efficiency, in order to promote the optimum 
administration of justice. To the extent possible, the good arbitrator will seek to balance the 
                                                 
2  See Phillipe Fouchard, ‘Où va l’arbitrage international?’, 34(3) McGill Law Journal (1989) p. 
435. 
3  The enormity of the mission brings to mind the well-known comment by General Charles de 
Gaulle, who upon being interrupted by a heckler who yelled, “à bas les imbéciles” (“Down with 
all idiots”) – or something even stronger – drew the response, “Un vaste programme” (a very 
large project). 
4  See William W. Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’, 1 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement (2010) p. 25. 
5  Arbitrator bias, of course, presents tensions of its own. See, generally, William W. Park, 
‘Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent’, 46 San Diego L. Rev. (2009) p. 629. 
Critics of arbitration often talk as if bias remains a problem unique to arbitrators. Yet in the real 
world judges also fall prey to unacceptable predispositions. See, e.g., Notice and Order of George 
H. Painter, Administrative Law Judge, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17 September 
2010, reporting on a colleague who during nearly 20 years of service on the bench had never 
ruled in favour of a claimant. See also Michael Shroeder, ‘If You’ve Got a Beef With a Future 
Broker, This Judge Isn’t for You’, Wall Street J., 13 December 2000, p. A1. 
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first two goals, accuracy and fairness, to arrive at a counterpoise that reduces the prospect of 
undue cost and delay.6 
 
In the world of statutes, treaties and court decisions, a violation of the duties of accuracy and 
efficiency would not normally in itself trigger intervention by a reviewing authority, whether 
it be a national court or an ad hoc ICSID committee.7 The possibility that an arbitrator will 
make a mistake, or be less than efficient, remains a risk assumed by both sides. 
 
By contrast, violation of arbitration’s basic procedural fairness does and should give rise to 
sanctions. Such scrutiny of procedural fairness also serves to promote accuracy by 
encouraging arbitrators to listen to both sides before deciding, and permits review of the 
calculus by which arbitrators aim for efficiency.8 
 
The penalty for breach of an arbitrator’s duty of fairness carries a certain irony, in that 
sanctions do not fall directly on the arbitrator who breached his or her duty. Although they 
may suffer a loss of reputation, offending arbitrators can benefit from immunity even for 
violations of basic procedural integrity.9 The price of misconduct thus falls more directly on 
the prevailing party, which must suffer annulment of an award for breach of fundamental 
procedural integrity. 
                                                 
6  A 2010 study by the Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group found that 100% of 
corporate counsel think arbitration takes too long, and 69% think it costs too much. Lucy Reed, 
‘More on Corporate Criticism of International Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (16 July 
2010), available at: <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com> (blaming delays on the limited 
availability of top-tier arbitrators and their “excessive concern for due process”). Another study, 
co-sponsored by a major law firm and a London university, suggested that 50% of the 
participating respondents were dissatisfied with the performance of arbitrators in international 
arbitration. See 2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration, 
White & Case LLP and School of International Arbitration (Queen Mary, University of London) 
(2010). The study follows an earlier survey sponsored by PriceWaterhouse. 
7  Annulment is generally only appropriate when the appealing party can show that the tribunal was 
not properly constituted, it exceeded its powers, there was corruption on the part of a member of 
the tribunal, there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure or the award 
failed to state the reasons on which it was based. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act § 10; Article 
1520 of the French Code de procédure civile; Article 52 of the ICSID Convention of 1965. 
8  For contemporary debate on efficiency, see Alan Redfern, ‘Stemming the Tide of Judicialisation 
of International Arbitration’, 2 World Arb. & Med. Rev. (2008) p. 21 at p. 37; Jean-Claude Najar, 
‘A Pro Domo Pleading: Of In-House Counsel, and their Necessary Participation in International 
Commercial Arbitration’, 25 J. Int’l Arb. (2008) p. 623; Michael McIlwrath, ‘Ignoring the 
Elephant in the Room: International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices’, 2 World 
Arb. & Med. Rev. (2008) p. 111; Peter Morton, ‘Can a World Exist Where Expedited Arbitration 
Becomes the Default Procedure?’, 26 Arb. Int’l (2010) p. 103; Jean-Claude Najar, ‘Inside Out: A 
User’s Perspective on Challenges in International Arbitration’, 25 Arb. Int’l (2009) p. 515; Jean-
François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, ‘Nature et efficacité des décisions prises par l’arbitre en 
cours de procédure au sujet des frais de l’arbitrage’, in Edgar Philippin et al., eds., Mélanges en 
l’honneur de François Dessemontet (2009) p. 297. 
9  In one case, where a sole arbitrator failed to disclose his romantic relationship with the sister of 
respondent’s counsel, immunity was upheld even though the award had been vacated. See La 
Serena Properties v. Weisbach, 186 Cal. App. 4th 893, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010), in which claimants argued that the arbitrator should be liable for fraudulently inducing 
them to approve his appointment in a case which essentially denied the claim. The reviewing 
court found disclosure to be an integral part of the arbitral process and thus protected by common 
law immunity for quasi-judicial acts. 
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B.  An Enforceable Award 
 
These ‘three musketeers’ of arbitrator duty – accuracy, fairness and efficiency – each play an 
essential role in enhancing and protecting the reliability and neutrality of binding private 
dispute resolution. The litigants, however, may expect something more. 
 
Fans of the original Three Musketeers will remember that the adventure includes a fourth 
young man, d’Artagnan, who hopes to become one of the King’s guards.10 Along with his 
friends Athos, Porthos and Aramis, he aims to live by the motto ‘All for one, one for all’ 
(‘Tous pour un, un pour tous’). Likewise, an additional responsibility figures prominently in 
the catalogue of an arbitrator’s duties. 
 
This fourth duty entails arbitrator vigilance in promoting an enforceable award. Prevailing 
litigants normally hope that the arbitral process will lead to something more than a piece of 
paper. To this end, they expect arbitrators to avoid giving reasons for annulment or non-
recognition to any authority called to review the award.11 
 
As we shall see shortly, these four duties can sometimes conflict with each other, operating in 
anything but the ‘one-for-all’ spirit. Notwithstanding an appearance of compatibility when 
viewed as abstractions, an inherent rivalry often permeates the various obligations when 
implemented in practice. Too much efficiency may mean too little accuracy. Overly intricate 
procedural safeguards can paralyze proceedings. And, in some cases, attempts to please a 
reviewing court can reduce the arbitrator’s fidelity to the parties’ expectations. 
 
III.  Two Recent Cases: Stolt-Nielsen and Caribbean Niquel 
 
Two judicial decisions rendered this past spring, one in France and the other in the United 
States, highlight the complex interactions among an arbitrator’s duties. In both, arbitral 
awards rendered by thoughtful and experienced tribunals were vacated for failure to balance 
competing duties in the manner desired by the reviewing court. By weighing the duty to treat 
the parties fairly and the duty to promote efficiency as they did, the tribunals were unable to 
succeed in rendering an enforceable award.12 
 
C.  Caribbean Niquel (Overseas Mining) 
 
1.  The Right to Comment on Legal Theories 
 
                                                 
10  Alexandre Dumas, Les Trois Mousequetaires (1844). 
11  This duty of enforceability has been memorialized in institutional arbitration rules. Article 35 of 
the ICC Rules provides: “In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the [ICC] Court 
and the Arbitral Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every effort to make 
sure that the Award is enforceable at law.” The LCIA Rules provide in Article 32.2: “In all 
matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the LCIA Court, the Arbitral Tribunal and the 
parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that 
an award is legally enforceable.” 
12  On the interaction between an arbitrator’s discretion to craft proceedings and the elements of due 
process, see, e.g., William W. Park, ‘Two Faces of Progress: Fairness and Flexibility in Arbitral 
Procedure’, 23 Arb. Int’l (2007) p. 499. 
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At the end of March 2010, the Paris Cour d’appel decided the case of Caribbean Niquel v. 
Overseas Mining,13 which considered the parties’ rights to address new legal theories in a 
context that pitted the aim of efficiency against the goal of due process, or principe du 
contradictoire. 
 
After a Cuban mining joint venture had gone sour, arbitrators sitting in Paris awarded the 
claimant USD 45 million on a theory of ‘lost chance’ (perte de chance de poursuivre le 
projet), even though the parties had argued a theory of quantum based on lost profits (le gain 
manqué). One can well imagine that arbitrators would not find it satisfying to apply a ‘lost 
profits’ theory with respect to a mine that had not yet become operative.14 
 
The Cour d’appel vacated the award for violation of provisions in the Code de procédure 
civile related to the right to be heard (principe de la contradiction15) and procedural public 
policy (ordre public procédural).16 Although not questioning the assumption that arbitrators 
know the law, often expressed as jura novit curia,17 the Cour d’appel found it unacceptable 
that an award should rest on a method of damages calculation that counsel had not had an 
adequate opportunity to address.18 
                                                 
13  La Société Commercial Caribbean Niquel v. La Société Overseas Mining Investments Ltd., Paris 
Court of Appeals, 1st Chamber, 08/23901, 25 March 2010. 
14  Indeed, the tribunal held that calculating the lost economic benefit was too uncertain, whereas 
calculating the value of the chance to take advantage of an economic opportunity could 
“undeniably” be evaluated. The tribunal therefore based the reasoning in its award on the legal 
theory that the party should be compensated for the economic value of the lost opportunity. 
15  The principe du contradictoire has been memorialized in the Code de procédure civile as the 
principe de la contradiction. 
16  As in force at the time of the Cour d’appel decision, these provisions were contained in Article 
1502 of the CPC, which provided inter alia as follows: 
 “L’appel de la décision qui accorde la reconnaissance ou l’exécution n’est ouvert que dans les 
cas suivants: 
 … 
 4° Lorsque le principe de la contradiction n’a pas été respecté; 
 5° Si la reconnaissance ou l’exécution sont contraires à l’ordre public international.” 
 In early 2011, the CPC was amended such that these two clauses are now found in Article 1520, 
albeit with the same formulation. See Décret no. 2011-48 du 13 janvier 2011 portant réforme de 
l’arbitrage. 
17  For a recent decision on the judge’s ability to deal with questions of law, see Judge Posner’s 
concurrence in Bodum USA v. La Cafetière Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 631-638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
Although Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to take into account 
any admissible evidence in understanding a rule of foreign law, including expert testimony, it 
does not require reliance on an expert. Federal courts in the United States regularly apply the law 
of all 50 states without necessarily being well versed in the intricacies of state law, and without 
relying on expert testimony, because ‘judges are experts on law’. Party-appointed experts, 
however, are chosen not because of their objective expertise in a country’s law but rather because 
his or her interpretation of that law helps the appointing party. 
18  Other decisions in both France and Switzerland have come to similar conclusions. In Engel 
Austria v. Don Trade, Paris Cour d’appel, 3 December 2009, the court annulled the award for 
having been based on “imprévision” (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage) without giving the parties 
an adequate opportunity to comment on that doctrine. See Andrea Carlevaris, ‘L’arbitre 
international entre Charybde et Scylla: le principe de la contradiction et impartialité de l’arbitre’, 
2 Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage (2002) p. 433. When faced with a similar problem, the highest court 
in Switzerland, the Tribunal Fédéral or Bundesgericht, annulled a decision of the Tribunal 
Arbitral du Sport for voiding an exclusivity clause in a contract on the basis of a Swiss law that 
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2.  Conflicting Duties 
 
The Cour d’appel’s decision is not without its problems and provides a stark example of the 
difficulty arbitrators face when balancing their various duties, with each alternative approach 
springing its own trap. Imagine that the arbitrators in Caribbean Niquel, in the midst of their 
deliberations, had re-opened the proceedings to set a briefing schedule on the new legal 
theory of lost chance. There would have been moaning all around about added expense and 
delay. More significantly, in raising the new theory with the parties to provide counsel an 
opportunity to comment, the tribunal might have been perceived as lacking even-handedness 
and impartiality. The respondent would likely have said, with some justification: “Hey! You 
arbitrators are acting as counsellors for claimant, sending a not-so-subtle signal that its 
chances of success will be greater with an amended pleading that includes a new method of 
damages calculation.” 
 
Finally, it would have been equally problematic for the arbitrators to decide the case without 
any consideration of the ‘lost chance’ measure of damages. The arbitrators would have been 
faced with the unattractive choice between granting recovery simply for lost profits, which 
would not necessarily have yielded a correct amount, or denying recovery entirely, which 
would have penalized an otherwise meritorious claim. Although arbitrators normally hesitate 
to look beyond the relief requested, they should also be timid about rejecting claims simply 
on the basis of nuances in related legal theories that may not have been apparent to counsel.19 
 
To complicate matters further, the concepts of fairness, accuracy, efficiency and 
enforceability are not monolithic. Each notion includes multiple obligations. Tensions thus 
exist not only among fairness, accuracy, efficiency and enforceability, but also within the 
various diverse components of each duty. Procedural fairness in particular encompasses a 
variety of distinct yet related obligations that in practice often compete against each other. 
The opportunity to address a new legal theory promotes the parties’ right to be heard. 
However, suggesting a new theory in the first place potentially exposes arbitrators to a charge 
of being biased. 
 
The scenario evoked in Caribbean Niquel demonstrates how an arbitrator’s attempt to 
improve proceedings from one perspective can make things worse from another angle. 
Enhancing efficiency can reduce fairness and accuracy. And promoting one element of 
fairness can diminish realization of another. In the words of an old American adage, 
arbitrators can be ‘damned if they do and damned if they don’t’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the parties had no chance to discuss. See José Urquijo Goitia c/ Liedson Da Silva Muñiz, 
Tribunal fédéral, 9 February 2009. However, the trend is not universal. See Supreme Court of 
Finland, Werfen Austria GmbH c/ Polar Electro Europe B.V., Zug Branch, 2 July 2008. 
19  Although an arbitrator must hear the parties’ arguments on any legal theory, it is not always easy 
to draw a line between legal reasoning (which is properly presented in the arbitral award) and the 
legal theories on which the award is based (on which the parties must be allowed to comment). 
Fear of stepping over the line cautions arbitrators away from suggesting new legal theories, and 
potentially appearing to favour one side or the other. La Semaine Juridique Ed. G, No. 23, 7 June 
2010, pp. 1202-03, obs. Christophe Seraglini. 
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D.  Stolt-Nielsen 
1.  Excess of Authority 
 
Approximately a month after the Cour d’appel decision in Caribbean Niquel, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds.20 The case arose from multiple 
actions for price fixing filed against several shipowners by customers who had chartered 
vessels, commonly known as ‘parcel tankers’, to transport liquids such as food oils and 
chemicals. The customers alleged that the owners had engaged in anti-competitive 
practices.21 All of the charter parties included similar arbitration clauses. 
 
The customers requested a single consolidated proceeding to address their combined claims, 
which in the United States is often called ‘class action arbitration’, borrowing a term from 
American court procedures.22 They may have felt that consolidation would permit them to 
muster more significant legal firepower or reduce costs to the level of making the litigation 
worthwhile.23 Not surprisingly, the shipowners opposed consolidation, preferring a ‘divide 
and conquer’ litigation strategy. 
 
In 2005, after a district court had ordered consolidation of the related court actions,24 the 
parties agreed to constitute a tribunal pursuant to the American Arbitration Association’s 
                                                 
20  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010). The charter parties 
included arbitration agreements referring “any dispute arising from [their] making, performance 
or termination” of arbitration in New York in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Although initially the cases implicated both the Vegoilvoy and Asbatankvoy charter parties, the 
US Supreme Court ultimately addressed only disputes under the former. 
21  In a companion criminal case, Stolt-Nielsen itself had admitted to engaging in an illegal cartel. In 
exchange, the Department of Justice granted amnesty. In 2003, however, the Department of 
Justice attempted to renegotiate the deal, claiming that Stolt-Nielsen had failed to take corrective 
action. In 2007, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the Department of Justice could 
not withdraw its bargain once Stolt-Nielsen executives had relinquished their Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. United States v. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., 524 F.Supp. 2d 586 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
22  Although slightly misleading in the context of arbitration, the term ‘class action arbitration’ is 
now widely used to describe consolidated arbitration proceedings. In a true class action, under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a small number of claimants is ‘certified’ to 
represent a larger class of claimants which  have substantially similar claims, whether they know 
it or not. In Stolt-Nielsen, by contrast, there was no attempt to join parties which had not signed 
arbitration agreements with each other. In essence, the term is used as another way to describe 
consolidation of related claims and counterclaims that implicate different parties, all of which 
have agreed to arbitration with each other on a bilateral basis, if not necessarily in a group 
proceeding. 
23  During the arbitration proceeding, counsel for claimant argued that the claims against Stolt-
Nielsen were ‘negative value’ claims that would cost more to litigate than could be recovered in 
case of a victory. Transcript of Stolt-Nielsen arbitration, at 82a-83a. Rightly or wrongly, Justice 
Ginsburg in her dissent suggested that “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”. See Stolt-
Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1783. One can only speculate on the effect of this ‘negative value’ on the 
settlement reached between Stolt-Nielsen and AnimalFeeds on 26 October 2010, when the US 
District Court for the District of Connecticut approved AnimalFeeds’ voluntary dismissal of its 
claim. 
24  The district court ordered consolidation of the various related anti-trust proceedings pending 
before it. See In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 296 F.Supp. 2d 1370 
(JPML 2003). 
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Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (AAA Rules for Class Arbitrations) to address 
whether the arbitrations could and should be consolidated.25 To make a long story a bit 
shorter, the arbitrators rendered a partial award construing the arbitration clause to permit a 
class arbitration to proceed if certain prerequisites were met, such as common questions of 
law and fact among the class members. That path must have seemed likely to yield a more 
efficient process, providing savings in time and cost by permitting similar and related claims 
to be grouped into a single streamlined proceeding. 
 
The shipowners were not impressed and sought to vacate the award for excess of authority 
under the Federal Arbitration Act.26 Ultimately, a majority of the US Supreme Court27 held 
that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority by imposing personal views of sound 
arbitration policy rather than deciding pursuant to applicable law as it existed.28 The Court 
based its conclusion on a somewhat unusual feature of the case, which was a post-dispute 
stipulation concluded by the parties confirming that their contracts were silent on the matter 
of class action arbitrations, in the sense that ‘no agreement’ had been reached. In this context, 
it is significant that the Court did not say that the parties had to agree explicitly to class 
arbitration but that in the case at bar there was no agreement at all, whether explicit or 
implicit.29 
 
In the view of the majority, the shipowners’ procedural right not to be subject to a class 
arbitration to which they had not consented trumped the arbitrators’ ability to craft a more 
efficient proceeding. The Court chose procedural fairness, in the sense of giving effect to the 
original agreement of the parties, rather than efficiency in the sense of avoiding costs that 
would likely discourage pursuit of the claim. 
2.  The Political Context 
 
The decision divided the Court sharply along political lines. A vigorous dissent by three 
Court members argued that the arbitrators were simply doing what the parties had asked of 
                                                 
25  AnimalFeeds brought the claim on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated in a putative 
class action under FRCP Rule 23 against Stolt-Nielsen, Odfjell, Jo Tankers and Tokyo Marine. 
26  FAA § 10(a)(4) “arbitrators exceeded their powers”. 
27  The majority opinion of the Supreme Court was authored by Justice Alito, joined by Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, joined by 
Justices Breyer and Stevens. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York had vacated the award, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 15 June 2009, but Justice Sotomayor took no 
part in the Supreme Court’s decision, having been on the Second Circuit when the case was on 
appeal. She did, however, agree with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer on 21 June 2010 by 
joining in Justice Stevens’s dissent in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 
(2010). 
28  Justice Alito wrote: “It is only when an arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the 
agreement and effectively dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may be 
unenforceable. In that situation, an arbitration decision may be vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the 
FAA on the ground that the arbitrator ‘exceeded [his] powers,’ for the task of an arbitrator is to 
interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy. In this case, we must conclude that 
what the arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding class 
arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen at 1767-1768. 
29  See Stolt-Nielsen, at n. 10: “We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a 
finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration.” 
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them in the supplemental arbitration agreement invoking the AAA Rules for Class 
Arbitrations.30 
 
In this connection, the political dimensions of the case are interesting. Arbitration generally 
finds favour with justices on the right, who view the process as favourable to freedom of 
contract. In the United States, this means avoiding the civil jury, which would in some 
instances be suspected of having an ‘anti-business’ bias. 
 
Preferences get reversed, however, with respect to ‘class action’ arbitration, which tends to be 
seen as an anti-business litigation tool used by consumers and the so-called ‘plaintiffs’ bar’, 
which often takes such cases on a contingency fee basis. Consolidation through class action 
arbitration appears to the left-leaning judges as a ‘pro-consumer’ mechanism permitting 
litigants with small claims to group together and engage more high-powered legal teams than 
would otherwise be possible.31 
3.  Merits v. Jurisdiction 
 
The chief mischief of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its potential to decrease the finality of arbitration 
by making it easier for courts to vacate awards. Few would argue with the proposition that 
“the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy”.32 
The difficulty lies in the way the Court used that general proposition to create a new path for 
annulment of an award simply because the arbitrators got it wrong on the substantive merits 
of the question submitted to them for determination. 
 
In its zeal to send a signal of the admittedly problematic nature of class action arbitration, the 
majority conflated two distinct questions. The first relates to the limits of an arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction, which falls within the province of a national court’s review. The second 
concerns the merits of an arbitrator’s substantive decision, which courts would not normally 
second-guess.33 
 
Not without reason, the opinion by Justice Alito rested on the fact that both sides had 
stipulated that the contract was silent in the sense of there being ‘no agreement’ as to a class 
action arbitration. However, the parties had provided that the panel would decide the question 
of class arbitration according to Rules 3 through 7 of the AAA Rules for Class Arbitrations. 
Rule 3 of these procedures, titled ‘Construction of the Arbitration Clause’, provides the 
arbitrators with an explicit grant of jurisdiction, as follows: 
 
                                                 
30  The dissent pointed out that the parties had executed a supplementary agreement providing that 
the question of whether class action arbitrations were allowed was to be decided pursuant to the 
AAA Rules for Class Arbitrations. Rule 3 of these rules explicitly grants the arbitrators the 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the arbitration can proceed on behalf of a class. 
31  Protecting consumers from arbitration is currently in vogue in the United States, with both the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 21 July 2010 and the pending Arbitration Fairness Act invalidating pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate in cases with seeming imbalances in bargaining power and legal 
sophistication between the two contracting parties. See also Department of Defense Regulation 
Restricting the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R. §§ 212, 222 and 252 (19 
May 2010). 
32  Stolt-Nielsen majority opinion at 1768, continuing that the award must be vacated because the 
tribunal simply “impose[d] its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration”. 
33  See, generally, William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, ICCA 
Series No. 13 (2007). 
10 
“Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a 
reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether 
the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or 
against a class (the ‘Clause Construction Award’).”34 
 
These prerequisites are set forth in Rule 4, which provides that the arbitrator shall permit one 
or more members of a class to act as representatives only if each of the following conditions 
is met: 
 
“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf of all 
members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class; 
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class; and 
(6) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration 
clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class representative(s) 
and each of the other class members.” 
 
For those concerned about the reciprocal nature of arbitration’s consensual underpinning, 
clause six as drafted contains a troubling ambiguity, and the analogy to class actions in court 
may not be appropriate. Clause six says only that “each class member” must agree to 
arbitration, not that the respondent must also agree with the claimant class member. At least 
two possibilities present themselves. 
 
One scenario posits arbitrators directing class proceedings between shipowners and 
customers on the basis of prior contracts that already contain arbitration clauses or on the 
basis of bilateral post-dispute arbitration agreements. Clause six, however, seems to leave 
open the prospect that someone who never had an arbitration agreement with the owners 
might gain entrance to the proceedings merely by signing a unilateral commitment to 
arbitrate, without reciprocal acceptance by the owners. The latter scenario is far more 
problematic than the former. Like marriage, an agreement to arbitration does not exist in the 
abstract, but with respect to a designated person. 
 
One consequence of adopting AAA procedures is that the question addressed by the majority 
– “What did the parties agree?” – became a matter submitted to the arbitral tribunal for 
determination. The arbitrators were explicitly empowered by the parties to address whether 
                                                 
34  Moreover, Rule 3 recognizes that such a determination will be considered an award subject to 
review pursuant to the normal grounds for vacatur, but no more, as provided in the Federal 
Arbitration Act. The Rule continues: “The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the 
issuance of the Clause Construction Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to 
move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause Construction Award.” 
The point of Rule 3 is to construe the contract, as a threshold matter, to determine whether the 
parties agreed to submit their dispute to class arbitration at all. The AAA Rules go on in Rule 4 
to describe the criteria for certification of a class (assuming Rule 3 is satisfied), according to 
factors that largely parallel those set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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the arbitration clause permits the case to proceed on behalf of, or against, a class.35 In 
essence, the parties moved the matter from the realm of jurisdiction to that of the substantive 
merits of the case. 
 
Thus, the majority gave the right answer to the wrong question. One can accept the majority’s 
view that the better construction of the parties’ stipulation precludes class action arbitration. 
However, that question had been given to the arbitrators, not the courts, by the parties’ 
subsequent agreement to apply the AAA Rules for Class Arbitrations. Consequently, a 
reviewing court should have overturned the award only on a finding of grounds for vacatur as 
provided in Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which include matters such as bias or 
lack of due process, but not a simple mistake in a finding of fact or law. 
4.  Standard of Review 
 
In finding that the award should be vacated, the majority invoked excess of authority, one of 
the grounds for vacatur listed in the Federal Arbitration Act.36 Under the facts of the case, 
however, the Court may well have blurred the distinction between excess of jurisdiction and a 
simple mistake of law. 
 
True enough, any error of law might be cast as a disregard of arbitral jurisdiction, in the sense 
that the litigants do not expressly empower an arbitrator to make a mistake. Such a stretch, 
however, ignores that the parties asked an arbitrator, not a judge, to decide the case, thereby 
assuming the risk that the arbitrator might get it wrong. 
 
In this context, one may recall a case handed down by the United States Supreme Court a 
century and a half ago. After a series of oppressive lawsuits filed by a New York merchant 
against an Illinois store owner, the two businessmen agreed to arbitrate their differences 
before arbitrators, who ultimately awarded damages to the ill-treated storekeeper. When the 
New Yorker succeeded in having the award set aside, the Supreme Court reversed with the 
following reasoning: 
 
“If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the 
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it 
aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the 
judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary] in place of the judges chosen by the 
parties [the arbitrators], and would make an award the commencement, not the end, 
of litigation.”37 
 
                                                 
35  The applicability of these AAA procedures was explicitly recognized by the majority. See Stolt-
Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765. 
36  In this context, it is disappointing that the Court failed to address the much vexed matter of 
whether ‘manifest disregard of the law’, as an independent ground for review separate from 
excess of authority, survived the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Hall Street v. Mattel, 552 US 
576. Footnote 3 of the Stolt-Nielsen majority opinion avoided any confrontation with that 
question, holding that, if such a standard existed, it was satisfied. More recently, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari of a case implicating further evaluation of the manifest disregard 
standard. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Lagstein, 607 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2010), 
petition for cert. denied (No. 10-534). 
37  Burchell v. Marsh, 58 US 344, 349 (1855). 
12 
To extend jurisdictional analysis further would permit any unhappy loser in a fair proceeding 
to renege on the bargain to arbitrate. 
 
Nothing odd or unusual lurks in saying that a question of jurisdiction becomes an issue of 
substantive merits of an arbitration if the parties conclude a clear agreement to that effect 
following commencement of their dispute. A forged signature on an arbitration clause would 
normally vitiate consent, giving rise to a jurisdictional objection. Yet it would always be up 
to the person alleging forgery to agree to arbitrate the matter.38 
 
Any thoughtful observer must give serious consideration to the majority’s view that an excess 
of authority occurred through alleged policy-making attempts by the arbitrators.39 Such an 
argument would have had more force, however, had the parties not concluded their second 
arbitration agreement referring to the AAA Rules for Class Arbitrations, which explicitly 
gave the arbitrators the task of construing the arbitration clause in question. 
 
At some point, of course, an arbitral tribunal might decide a matter by simply inventing a 
legal standard informed only by its members’ personal policy preferences. It would not be 
surprising if such behaviour merited characterization as excess of authority. The facts of 
Stolt-Nielsen, however, do not lend themselves to painting the arbitrators as such wild cards, 
particularly in light of the confused state of existing federal arbitration law on the matter.40 
 
With respect to public policy, it may well be that arbitration is ill suited to American-style 
class actions. Arbitration proceedings that would go so far as to join non-signatories might 
violate the fundamental principle that arbitration is consensual, contractual and private.41 
                                                 
38  Such delegation of jurisdictional authority in a separate agreement is exactly what happened in 
Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry of Food and Agriculture (The Emmanuel 
Colocotronis No. 2), [1982] 1 All E.R. 823. Buyers of wheat refused to arbitrate a dispute with 
the shipper on the theory that the arbitration clause in the charter party had not been incorporated 
in the bill of lading. The parties submitted to ad hoc arbitration the question of whether the 
arbitration clause was incorporated into the bill of lading, and were held to be bound by an award 
which found that buyers had agreed to arbitrate based on language in the bill of lading providing 
“All other conditions … as per … charter party”. 
39  The sting in the majority’s vacatur of the award lies in the line: “what the arbitration panel did 
was simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen at 
1767-1768. 
40  The law on consolidation was anything but clear following a decision seven years earlier in 
which a plurality of the US Supreme Court had given arbitrators a right to determine whether 
class action was permitted. See Green Tree v. Bazzle, 539 US 444 (2003). 
41  In some instances, of course, non-signatories may be brought into a proceeding on the basis of 
findings of agency or facts that justify piercing the corporate veil. See generally, William W. 
Park, ‘Non-Signatories and International Contract: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma’, in Multiple Party 
Actions in International Arbitration (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2009) p. 3. For a recent 
decision of the British Supreme Court (as it now styles itself), see Dallah Real Estate and 
Tourism Holding Co. v. Government of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46 (3 November 2010). 
Although the British court held that there no justification to join the government of Pakistan, an 
analogous decision by the Paris Cour d’appel came to the opposite conclusion and dismissed the 
action by Pakistan to set aside an award against the state. See Cour d’appel de Paris, 17 February 
2011, No. d’inscription 09/28533, Governement du Pakistan v. Société Dallah. The US Supreme 
Court, of course, is well aware of the various theories on which non-signatories might be joined 
in arbitration. See Arthur Andersen v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009), addressing notions of 
third-party beneficiaries. 
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Under the particular facts of Stolt-Nielsen, however, the arbitrators simply provided for 
consolidation among parties that had all signed arbitration agreements. No attempt was made 
to include non-signatories. Rather, the issue was whether the parties had intended such a 
group proceeding.42 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court may have skewed analysis in order to make the otherwise 
legitimate point about the possible risks inherent in class arbitrations. Of course, some who 
favour judicial restraint might consider the matter more appropriate for policy-making 
legislators rather than judges deciding a particular case or controversy. 
 
The dissent may have fared somewhat better in construing the various agreements together: 
the stipulation, the original arbitration clause and the subsequent adoption of the AAA Rules. 
The opinion by Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the effect of the supplemental agreement to 
apply the AAA Rules, although it also invoked an argument that the award was not yet “ripe” 
for final review.43 
 
Before leaving Stolt-Nielsen, it may be well to ask what effect the case will have on the future 
of arbitration in the United States, apart from possibly making it easier for courts to vacate 
awards when the judge and the arbitrator disagree. On its narrow facts, the case may have 
little precedential value because its holding rests on an explicit stipulation about what had 
been agreed, a state of affairs not likely to be repeated if the side asserting class action 
arbitration is represented by competent counsel.44 Nevertheless, the case creates at least four 
areas to watch. 
 
First, the majority decision sows confusion on the difference between the substantive merits 
of a dispute (within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to decide) and a genuine excess of power 
(reviewable by a court). The resulting decrease in award finality within the United States will 
do few favours to the integrity of the arbitral process. By ignoring the litigants’ agreement to 
submit the question of class arbitration to the arbitrators, pursuant to the AAA Rules for Class 
Arbitrations, the Court created a new path for annulling awards when the reviewing judge 
thinks the arbitrators got it wrong. 
                                                 
42  Court-ordered consolidation has been allowed under some arbitration statutes. See, e.g., 
Massachusetts Gen. Laws, c. 251, § 2A, allowing consolidation as provided in the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Rule 42 permits joinder of actions “involving a common 
question of law or fact”. The provision was applied in New England Energy v. Keystone 
Shipping, 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), which held that a federal district court could grant 
consolidation pursuant to Massachusetts state law where the parties’ agreement was silent on 
such matter. See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90 § 7N1/2, requiring non-voluntary arbitration of 
claims over allegedly defective vehicles. Compare California Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.3, 
which permits consolidation of arbitration proceedings that involve a “common issue or issues of 
law or fact” but requires that “separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the 
same parties; or that one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a 
third party”. Compare Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing Co., 998 
F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1993), limiting a court’s discretion to grant consolidation of arbitration 
proceedings arising from separate agreements “absent the parties’ agreement to allow such 
consolidation”. 
43  “The parties’ supplemental agreement, referring the class-arbitration issue to an arbitration panel, 
undoubtedly empowered the arbitrators to render their clause-construction decision. That 
scarcely debatable point should resolve this case.” Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1780. 
44  The agreement to adhere to the AAA Rules for Class Arbitrations will also likely not reoccur if 
the party wanting to avoid class arbitration has competent counsel. 
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Second, the dispute will doubtlessly focus the attention of practitioners on drafting arbitration 
clauses, whether within the framework of consumer transactions or business-to-business 
contracts.45 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen were 
sophisticated businesses with sufficient resources and experience to bargain, rather than 
parties subject to contracts of adhesion. Whether this argument cuts in favour or against a 
presumption to allow class action arbitration remains an open question.46 
 
Third, the problematic nature of class action arbitration will likely serve to further politicize 
discussions of arbitration in the United States. The matter is complicated by the fact that the 
United States has no general national statute to protect consumers and employees against 
abusive arbitration agreements, coupled with another American idiosyncrasy, the role of the 
civil jury in deciding contract claims. The business manager often tends to view arbitration as 
a way to avoid the more unreasonable aspects of court litigation, perceived (rightly or 
wrongly) as biased in favour of the consumer or employee and against the manufacturers or 
employers.47 
 
Finally, the case raises a question about whether courts outside the United States will stay 
legal actions arguably conflicting with class action proceedings. From the perspective of a 
French court, for example, class action proceedings against a French company may, quite 
understandably, appear to be an excess of arbitral jurisdiction. In all of these matters, Stolt-
Nielsen highlights the way in which tensions among the arbitrator’s various duties resist 
facile analysis. 
 
IV.  Enforceability Revisited 
 
Of all the arbitrators’ duties, the most persistently problematic may well be the obligation to 
seek an enforceable award. This obligation implicates not only tensions among the various 
duties themselves, but also conflicts between norms at the arbitral seat and the law of the 
enforcement forum. 
 
To illustrate how the duty to enhance fidelity to the parties’ agreement may conflict with 
procedural norms at the arbitral situs, few examples serve as well as Section 60 of the English 
Arbitration Act. This provision invalidates pre-dispute agreements to allocate arbitration 
                                                 
45  Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1783. See also Paul Friedland and Michael Ottolenghi, ‘Drafting Class 
Action Clauses After Stolt-Nielsen’, 65 Dispute Res. J. (May-October 2010) p. 22, who suggest 
explicitly addressing the question of class action arbitration in the arbitration clause to avoid any 
confusion resulting from how future courts will interpret Stolt-Nielsen. 
46  The effectiveness of waivers drafted to preclude recourse to class action arbitration is currently 
before the US Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (No. 09-893). Oral 
arguments heard on 9 November 2010 explored whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
reliance on state law related to unconscionability principles that strike down such waivers. 
47  The US Congress, however, can and has passed legislation limiting arbitration on behalf of 
special interest groups. See the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act of 2002, § 11028, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000)), sometimes known 
as the Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor, the late Sonny Bono. Recently, Senators 
Jeff Sessions and Russell Feingold proposed legislation intended to provide broad protection of 
consumer interests, albeit perhaps of an over-inclusive nature that sacrifices vital elements of 
party autonomy and efficient dispute resolution. See Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
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costs “in any event”.48 In advance of the dispute, parties may not by contract forbid an 
arbitrator from taking into account who won and who lost when allocating costs.49 The 
provision casts a wide net, serving not only as an anti-abuse mechanism to prevent ‘you-pay-
in-any-event’ clauses from discouraging claims by weaker parties, but also catches otherwise 
reasonable arrangements among sophisticated business managers to split arbitrator 
compensation on a 50/50 basis and to mandate that each side cover its own legal expenses. 
 
Of course, promoting award enforceability remains a two-edged sword in an international 
case. Although flouting clear contract language on cost allocation would please an English 
judge,50 the disregard of the parties’ ex ante expectations may appear as excess of authority to 
a New York court called to enforce an award of legal costs out of line with the agreement.51 
 
The US Supreme Court decision in the well-known Mitsubishi case presents another example 
of this dilemma, albeit with respect to substantive norms rather than procedure.52 An 
agreement involving a Japanese auto manufacturer and an American distributor provided for 
application of Swiss law by arbitrators sitting in Japan.53 Ordering arbitration, the Court 
nevertheless warned that American antitrust law must be considered by the arbitrators in 
connection with any antitrust counterclaim, despite the contractual choice-of-law clause.54 
 
The Mitsubishi pronouncements on United States competition law, like the English rule on 
cost allocation, place arbitrators between the Scylla and the Charybdis of inconsistent 
requirements. An arbitrator must satisfy norms both at the arbitral seat, where proceedings 
take place, and at the recognition forum, where the winner goes to attach assets. 
 
                                                 
48  Section 60, Arbitration Act of 1996: “An agreement which has the effect that a party is to pay the 
whole or part of the costs of the arbitration in any event is only valid if made after the dispute in 
question has arisen.” Section 61 goes on to set forth the general principle that “costs should 
follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not 
appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs”. This standard, however, is made subject 
to the parties’ agreement otherwise, which in context with Section 60 would be an agreement 
after the dispute has arisen. 
49  To be clear, the statute does not impose the English ‘costs follow the event’ rule, but simply 
invalidates pre-dispute attempts to eliminate the arbitrator’s discretion to consider who won and 
who lost in fixing obligations for items such as attorneys’ fees and amounts paid to the arbitrators 
and the arbitral institution. 
50  Presumably, Section 68 of the 1996 Act (“serious irregularity causing substantial injustice”) 
would permit judicial intervention with respect to an arbitrator’s failure to respect Section 60. 
51  Not infrequently, contracts between American policyholders and British insurers provide for 
London arbitration but subject to New York substantive law. These so-called ‘Bermuda Form’ 
arbitrations have been discussed in Richard Jacobs, Lorelie S. Masters and Paul Stanley, Liability 
Insurance in International Arbitration (2004). 
52  Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614 (1985). 
53  This particular choice of law explains itself by the fact that a Swiss affiliate of the American 
company Chrysler was also involved in the contractual arrangement with the distributor and the 
manufacturer. 
54  Mitsubishi footnote 19 suggests a ‘prospective waiver’ doctrine that would invalidate choice-of-
law agreements that operated to waive a right to pursue American remedies. Moreover, the so-
called ‘second look’ doctrine warned that American courts would exercise their power at the 
award enforcement stage to “ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws [of the United States] had been addressed”. 
16 
Another such conflict was presented in Accentuate Ltd. v. Asigra Inc.,55 involving an English 
distributor of software products under licence from a Canadian company. The contract called 
for application of Ontario law and arbitration in Toronto. After the Canadian company 
attempted to terminate the agreement and filed an arbitration in Toronto, an arbitral tribunal 
found for the distributor on its counterclaim for breach of contract. 
 
The problem, however, arose in connection with the distributor’s parallel request for damages 
under EU regulations concerning commercial agents, which the tribunal had decided were not 
covered by Ontario law. In a competing court action brought by the distributor in England, 
the Canadian company argued that the Toronto award barred claims related to the EU 
regulations. The High Court held that a determination had to be made on whether the 
regulations permitted the distributor to file an action independent of Ontario law.56 If the 
regulations did allow such a claim, the English court proceeding would not be stayed, and the 
award would have no res judicata effect on that matter.57 
 
In essence, the English court raised the prospect that the EU regulations might constitute 
mandatory norms (not unlike the antitrust counterclaims in Mitsubishi) from which the parties 
could not derogate. If so, then the award could not defeat the claim brought before the 
English court, given that the arbitrators had never addressed the matter, apparently 
considering the dispute governed solely by Ontario law.58 
 
Such cases raise the vexed matter of divergence between an arbitrator’s duties and the 
perspectives of courts called to intervene in the arbitral process. Whatever the obligation of 
judges reviewing awards, arbitrators themselves normally aim for fidelity to the parties’ 
bargain and thus hesitate to ignore explicit contract language, whether it be on applicable law 
or cost allocation. Judges are answerable to the citizenry as a whole, while arbitrators remain 
in large measure creatures of contract.59 
 
V.  Conclusion 
                                                 
55  [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB). 
56  The High Court also expressed the view that if the EU regulations did apply, a claim for 
compensation would be governed by English law. Id., at para. 92. 
57  The award was tested not in an application to refuse recognition, but rather in the collateral 
context of Section 9 of the English Arbitration Act, which permits a stay of legal proceedings 
connected to matters governed by an arbitration agreement, as long as that agreement does not 
fail for being null, void or inoperative. According to the High Court, the district judge “fell into 
error” by failing to determine whether a binding arbitration clause applied to the claims under the 
EU regulations, in the absence of which no award could be recognized on that point. Opinion of 
Justice Tugendhat, paragraph 95. 
58  In this connection, it is important to note that the effect of the award was challenged in the 
context of a competing legal claim brought in an English court. It may well be that the award 
would nevertheless retain its vigour under Article III of the New York Convention in some other 
recognition forum. However, the peculiar facts of this case make it unlikely for the Canadian 
company to rely on the award except as a bar to a rival judicial action. Although the arbitral 
tribunal held for the distributor under Ontario law, the amount of quantum presumably was far 
less than that available under the EU regulations. 
59  Of course, faithfulness to the agreement would not justify violation of international public policy 
in matters such as bribery, corruption or money laundering. However, on most matters within the 
bargaining rights of sophisticated parties (such as applicable law, costs and limitation on 
damages), arbitrators will normally strive to let the chips fall where they may notwithstanding 
idiosyncratic local rules. 
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The tensions among the arbitrator’s various duties often resist facile analysis or easy 
resolution. Hearing additional witnesses may promote fairness and accuracy, but at the 
expense of adding time and cost. Suggesting that counsel consider some new legal theory 
may promote fairness, in providing a fuller right to be heard, but at the risk of enhancing the 
prospect of award vacatur by creating a perception that arbitrators favour one side or the 
other. 
 
But, in some instances, rivalry among the arbitrator’s duties may end up being more 
troublesome in theory than in practice. An experienced arbitrator will often find it possible to 
exercise procedural discretion in a way that avoids conflict. Other tensions, however, may not 
be resolved in such a straightforward manner, particularly when a contract stipulates an 
applicable law at odds with mandatory norms of a relatively foreseeable enforcement forum. 
 
In all events, open recognition of the relevant tensions and rivalries will promote an optimum 
accommodation among the various duties. Compromise, not dogma or ideology, will 
normally remain the touchstone for achieving an appropriate counterpoise among accuracy, 
fairness, efficiency and enforceability. Although Scripture warns us that no one can serve two 
masters, such divided loyalty may remain the fate of a good arbitrator.60 
                                                 
60  See Matthew 6:24 and Luke 16:13. 
